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THE SAGA OF GRACIE TERRACE
Thomas R. Newman and Maro A. Goldstone*
In Superman I, when Superman gripped Lois Lane's arm from behind and
leaped with her from the terrace of her penthouse apartment into the night sky
on their first date, a flight over Manhattan and the Statute of Liberty, he took
off from the roof-terrace of an apartment that was the object of bitter litigation
that consumed our lives for three and one-half years and posed challenging
issues of landlord-tenant and insurance law.
The case, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone,1 was at the
center of a protracted dispute that eventually gave rise to seven lawsuits, doz-
ens of motions, several appeals, and reams of acrimonious correspondence. It
divided a residential community into two warring camps, trapping the non-
combatant tenants in the middle and compelling them to share in the Apartment
Corporation's hefty litigation expenses.
The nature of the action appears in a judicial decision, written early in the
course of the litigation, where the court observed that the parties were
"embroiled in a bitter and continuing feud since Mrs. Goldstone was ousted, in
1983, from her position as a director of the cooperative corporation," and that
"the present administration of the cooperative corporation would like to force
the [Goldstones] out of their occupancy of Penthouse B." 2
On one side was the Apartment Corporation, as owner of a luxury cooper-
ative apartment building, led by its then president Walter Albrecht.3 Gracie
Terrace is located at the end of 82nd Street at the East River, just south of Carl
Schurz Park and Gracie Mansion. On the other side were Dr. Jonas Goldstone,
the tenant under a Proprietary Lease of the duplex apartment Penthouse B (PH-
B), and his wife Maro, a real estate lawyer.4
Maro played an instrumental role in the conversion process, chairing the
negotiations on behalf of the tenants with the then owner-Sponsor, Norman K.
Winston, a prominent New York real estate developer and owner. For much of
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Newman is counsel to the firm of Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP, and coauthor of
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES (11 th ed. 2001) and
THOMAS R. NEWMAN, NEW YORK APPELLATE PRACTICE (Matthew Bender 1990). Ms.
Goldstone is a member of Newman & Company, P.C. and specializes in real estate
management. Copyright 2001 by Thomas R. Newman and Maro A. Goldstone. All rights
reserved.
1 477 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 1984).
2 Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Jonas Goldstone, No. 3941/84, slip op. at 1-2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 1984).
3 "[Walter] has [a] BA and MBA from Harvard College and the Harvard Business School
and studied at the London School of Economics." He was a Lt. Colonel in the USAFR. See
Letter from Maro Arrathoon Goldstone, President, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corporation, to
the Tenant-Shareholders of Gracie Terrace Apartment Corporation (May 24, 1982) (on file
with the Nevada Law Journal).
I Maro received her BA from Vassar College and an LLB from Columbia Law School. Id.
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the cooperative's first decade of existence, Maro was repeatedly re-elected as
its president. She had a hands-on management style and took an active role in
overseeing the maintenance of the building's physical plant, and the high level
of performance of its staff and outside Managing Agent.
In her May 1982 President's Report to the Tenant-Shareholders, Maro was
able to proudly announce that Gracie Terrace held "the City-wide record from
the lowest maintenance cost per room in a large luxury building operation with-
out deficit financing ' 5 and that the appreciation in market prices per room in
the ten years since conversion to cooperative ownership far exceeded that in
comparable buildings.
I. THE APARTMENT AND ITS HISTORICAL USE
Gracie Terrace contains nineteen stories plus two penthouse levels. The
lower penthouse level is shared by PH-A and PH-B, while the only rooms on
the upper penthouse level are part of the upper duplex portion of PH-B.
Adjoining the upper level of PH-B on its eastern, southern, and western sides,
are portions of the building's 2200 square foot continuous wrap-around tar and
gravel terrace/roof.
The eastern portion of the roof (about 1200 sq. ft), onto which the Gold-
stone's master bedroom6 opened, had been completely landscaped and
improved by the former rental tenants, with the permission of the building's
then owner, Norman K. Winston.
A redwood walkway in the form of a cross led from a concrete paved roof/
terrace outside the bedroom and bath to the parapet walls. It divided this part
of the eastern roof into four sections, each covered with white stones. Ivy,
climbing Robin Hood roses, and grape vines adorned the building and parapet
walls. A profusion of other flowers, berries, and fruit-bearing apple, pear,
peach, nectarine, apricot, and cherry trees grew out of redwood planter boxes.
Photographs of the fully planted and landscaped rooftop garden had been fea-
tured in The Terrace Gardner's Handbook' and The Garden Journal.8
PH-B was offered for sale by the Sponsor on the basis of a thorough phys-
ical inspection of both levels of the duplex apartment and the adjacent terraces,
roof areas, hallways, and stairs. The apartment was not sold to Dr. Goldstone
on the basis of any diagram, sketch, or floor plan.
The Sponsor's Selling Agent, who accompanied the Goldstones on their
inspection tours,9 told them that all the exterior and interior areas adjoining PH-
5 Id.
6 Recreated as Lois Lane's entrance foyer-living room in the Supennan I and I movies.
7 LINDA YANG, THE TERRACE GARDNER'S HANDBOOK (Doubleday & Co. 1995).
8 New York Botanical Garden, THE GARDEN JouRNAL (Feb. 1973).
9 The apartment was sold on the basis of a visual inspection. The Subscription Agreement
stated that the prospective purchaser has "inspected or been given the opportunity to inspect
the Apartment and have satisfied [him/herself] as to the condition thereof ... and [the Sub-
scription Agreement] shall also constitute [an] agreement to accept the Apartment in the
condition in which it shall be on the date of closing of title under the Plan .. " Paragraph 8
of the Subscription Agreement.
The Proprietary Lease allocated "the rooms in the building as partitioned on the date of
execution of the lease . . . together with their appurtenances . . . and any . . . terraces,
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B had always been, and were to continue to be, exclusively used by the occu-
pants of PH-B.10 He showed them physical evidence of this exclusive use: a
fence which prevented anyone on the southern portion of the roof (onto which
the fire stairs exited) from gaining access to the eastern portion, signs affixed to
the inside of the fire exit doors state "[n]o one permitted on roof at any time,"
cosmos blooming and corn growing in planter boxes on the western portion of
the roof, alarmed panic bolts on the interior of the doors leading from the fire
exit hallway on the southern end of the upper level of PH-B onto the fire stairs'
landing,11 abandoned gardening materials, suitcases with tags labeled "Cohen,"
and terrace furniture in the fire exit hallways.' 2
The improved and completely landscaped eastern roof/terrace which the
Goldstones saw on their inspection tours in April 1972, together with the apart-
ment's great views of the City13 and the privacy that came from being the only
persons allowed access to the entire wrap-around roof/terrace on the upper
level of PH-B, were what led the Goldstones to purchase PH-B and move out
of the large riverview apartment on the third floor of Gracie Terrace that they
had occupied for eight years.14
About one year after the building was converted to cooperative ownership,
the Goldstone's exclusive use of the roof areas outside their apartment was
challenged when certain new residents of the building proposed that the Apart-
ment Corporation install a deck for sun bathing purposes on the southern and
western portions of the building's roof, which were directly above the master
bedroom of PH-A and the entire lower level of PH-B. The Board appointed a
committee to look into the matter and report to the shareholders at the Annual
Meeting. Dr. Goldstone and the then occupant of PH-A, Arthur Godfrey,
threatened legal action against the corporation if the sun deck proposal was
approved. 15
balconies, roof, or portion thereof outside of said partitioned rooms ... exclusively to the
occupant of the apartment." See Record on Appeal at 270, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp.
v. Goldstone, 477 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 1984) (No. 01153/83). It stated "[t]he Lessee
shall take possession of the apartment and its appurtenances and fixtures "as is" as of the
commencement of the term hereof." Id. at 284 18(a).
10 Letter from Maro Arrathoon Goldstone, President, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corpora-
tion, to the Tenant-Shareholders of Gracie Terrace Apartment Corporation (May 24, 1982)
(on file with the Nevada Law Journal).
1l These panic bolts gave the occupants of PH-B one-way egress to the fire stairs from the
fire exit hall, while preventing anyone on the fire stairs from gaining access to this hall and,
from it, into the upper level of PH-B. Id.
12 Id.
13 To the northeast, one sees the Triborough Bridge and, in the distance, the Whitestone and
Throgs Neck Bridges. To the east lies Roosevelt Island and Queens. To the south, the mid-
town skyline, the 59th Street Bridge, the East River, and FDR Drive. When it is dark and
there is a traffic jam on the Drive, as frequently happens, from the apartment, the northbound
cars' headlights look like a shimmering diamond necklace, while southbound taillights shine
like rubies.
'4 The Appellate Division noted that this "was unquestionably a major inducing factor in
Dr. Goldstone's decision to purchase the apartment." See Gracie Terrace, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
649.
1 Letter from Maro A. Goldstone to Nevada Law Journal (Feb. 26, 2002) (on file with the
Nevada Law Journal).
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At its May 6, 1974 meeting, the Board (with Maro abstaining) voted to
accept its committee's recommendation that the sun deck not be built. Among
other things, the committee's report noted that the building's counsel had
advised that "stock has been purchased and proprietary leases issued in connec-
tion therewith on the basis of the existing structure"; construction of a sun deck
was sure to embroil the corporation in costly litigation; substantial expenditures
would have to be made to protect the roof's surface and probably to increase
the loading of the roof for public assembly usage; an increase in liability insur-
ance premiums could be expected; the roof was not constructed for heavy traf-
fic and had no insulating soundproofing layer; the waterproofing membrane
was likely to be damaged, resulting in leaks and damage to the two penthouse
apartments directly underneath with the potential for other lawsuits; and finally,
the security of the penthouse apartments on both levels would be seriously
compromised.'
6
For nearly ten years after their purchase of PH-B in January 1973, the
Goldstones enjoyed undisturbed, exclusive use of the eastern, southern, and
western roof areas and the upper level fire exit hallways adjoining their apart-
ment without challenge or incident.
II. THE SEEDS OF THE LITIGATION
After the conversion to cooperative ownership, when the initial Board of
Directors was elected to office, Walter Albrecht became treasurer of Gracie
Terrace. He was an officer of Citibank and surely understood the earning
power of money. Yet, on the instructions of the then outside Managing Agent,
who had prepared the operating budget for the co-op's first year of operation,
Walter permitted the building's $150,000 capital fund to lie fallow; supposedly
because the Managing Agent "was not sure" the co-op's income would be ade-
quate to operate the building. 7
Maro, then vice-president, said that, at the very least, the building's capital
fund should be put into an interest bearing money market account, from which
money could be drawn down if needed. Walter refused to go against the
wishes of the Managing Agent. Maro told him that he had a choice, invest the
money or reimburse the Apartment Corporation for its lost interest. When the
16 PH-A, located on the lower penthouse level was burglarized two times prior to the instal-
lation of alarmed gates on the fire stairs, as recommended by the New York City Police
Department. In both burglaries, the intruder was reported to have gained entry by going up
the fire stairs to the upper level penthouse landing and from there out to the southern portion
of the roof, from which he dropped onto the lower terrace-roof outside the master bedroom
of the Godfrey apartment.
The alarmed gates on the fire stairs were installed by the Board of Directors and
inspected and approved by the New York City Building Department at a time when Maro
was not on the Board. See Affidavit, Thomas Day Thacher II, in Gracie Terrace Apartment
Corp. v. Goldstone (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (No. 01153/83).
17 The building was protected against cost-overruns on ordinary maintenance and capital
expenditures by a unique five-year sponsor's guarantee. Therefore, even if the contingency
cushion built into the initial budget proved insufficient, the Sponsor would have to reimburse
the corporation for such overruns. Thus, there was no sensible reason to leave the entire
capital fund uninvested at a time when interest rates were high. Letter from Maro A. Gold-
stone to Nevada Law Journal (Feb. 26, 2002) (on file with the Nevada Law Journal).
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other directors supported Maro's position, Walter resigned as an officer and
director. He never forgave Maro.' s That was in 1973.
It has been said revenge is a dish best eaten cold. Walter was patient. He
seems never to have forgotten this incident. He could have reminded elephants.
Ten years later, after a bruising election campaign marked by vicious per-
sonal attacks on Maro, Walter and his supporters won control of the Board of
Directors. Walter became president of the co-op. He was now in a position to
repay Maro, who had been reelected as a minority director. He would go her
one better, however. Not only would he force her off the board, but out of the
building. Or so he thought.
His tone was an ugly mixture of superiority and hatred when he phoned
Maro and boldly announced, "I'm going to railroad your ass out of this build-
ing. I court-martialed another guy like you out of the Air Force."19 At about
the same time, in a memorandum to a fellow director, Walter outlined his
thoughts "about 'playing hardball."' "I'm coming to think we should change
the by-laws to freeze meathead [Maro] out." "It [is]... important that we get
her off" the board.20
Maro was not a "guy." Walter was no longer on active duty in the Air
Force. But these are quibbles. More to the point, Maro would prove to be a
formidable adversary, unlike anyone Walter, or the rest of his coterie, had ever
encountered.
Walter would have done well to recall Churchill's stirring admonition dur-
ing the darkest hours of World War II: "Never give in, never give in, never,
never, never, - in nothing, great or small, large or petty - never give in except
to convictions of honor and good sense."21
This would have given him an accurate measure of Maro. It might even
have made him realize the emptiness of his threat. He would never be able to
make it good.
By trying, he took the building on the legal equivalent of a jihad lasting
three years. When it was over, the Apartment Corporation had spent a small
fortune to finance bitter and divisive litigation that resulted in a final judgment
of the Supreme Court of the State of New York completely vindicating Maro
and establishing the Goldstone's right to the exclusive use and possession of
the entire top of the building.22 It also required the Apartment Corporation to
18 This and other comments about Albrecht's thoughts and feelings are our opinion based on
how we interpreted his behavior and the events that subsequently occurred.
19 Letter from Maro Arrathoon Goldstone, Director, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corporation,
to the Tenant-Shareholders of Gracie Terrace Apartment Corporation (May 24, 1983) (ver-
batim transcript of telephone call from Walter Albrecht to Maro Goldstone at 9:30 p.m. on
Feb. 16, 1983) (on file with the Nevada Law Journal).
20 Id.
21 Address at Harrow School (Oct. 29, 1941), quoted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
745 (15th ed. 1980).
22 The final judgment declared, inter alia, that "the eastern portion of the roof adjoining PH-
B is a part of the demised premises and is allocated exclusively to the occupants of that
apartment," that "any occupant of PH-B shall continue to have exclusive use of the adjoining
fire exit hallway on the upper duplex level of apartment PH-B," that Gracie Terrace would
advise all tenants that no one other than the Goldstones was "permitted to go up the fire
stairs and exit onto.. . the [southern and western portions of the] roof except in case of fire
or other emergency." It also proved that Gracie Terrace would pay the Goldstones $70,000
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reimburse the Goldstones for $70,000 of unreimbursed legal fees incurred in
their defense of its baseless claims.23
The Gracie Terrace litigation brings to mind the advice given by a Berlin
lawyer, an uncle of my father (also a lawyer), at the end of the nineteenth
century, equally valid today, on how to conduct litigation. His first rule was,
"Huete Dich vor Prozessen, Du kennst veilleicht den Anfang, abner nicht das
Ende." Guard yourself against lawsuits. You may know how they begin, but
not how they will end.
III. THE GRACIE TERRACE ACTION
On January 13, 1983, two days before expiration of the statute of limita-
tions on actions to recover possession of real property,24 the Apartment Corpo-
ration commenced an action against the Goldstones in Supreme Court, New
York County."
The Proprietary Lease "allocated exclusively to the occupant of the apart-
ment" the rooms in the building as partitioned on the date of execution of the
lease, "together with their appurtenances . and any ... terraces, balconies,
roof, or portion thereof outside of said partitioned rooms. 26 The Apartment
Corporation, however, sought to restrict the Goldstones' exclusive interest to
the small concrete portion of the eastern roof outside the glass windows and
terrace door of their master bedroom and bath. The rest of the eastern roof
(about 1,200 sq. ft.) was to be used in common by all 400 tenants and their
guests for sun bathing, star gazing, sightseeing, or such other diversions as
might appeal to them, including, presumably, peering into the Goldstones'
unshielded bedroom and bath.
Despite the Proprietary Lease's clear grant of exclusive possession, con-
firmed by decades of usage, both before and after the cooperative conversion,
Gracie Terrace's complaint asked for a judgment determining, inter alia, that
"the proprietary lease does not give the Goldstones any rights" to the roof, the
upper level fire exit hallway and fire stairs;2 7 that sole and complete possession
of the roof, the hall and the stairways be awarded to Gracie Terrace and that it
remain in possession thereof; 8 and that "the Goldstones be removed and
excluded from possession of the roof, the hall and the stairways . . . [and]
toward their defense costs. See Goldstone v. Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp., Index No.
419/86, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 8, 1986) (order and judgment); Gracie Terrace
Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone, No. 01153/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 8, 1986) (order and
judgment).
23 The rest of the Goldstones' litigation expenses (about $170,000) were covered by their
personal liability insurance carrier and the Apartment Corporation's D & 0 carrier. Letter
from Maro A. Goldstone to Nevada Law Journal (Feb. 26, 2002) (on file with the Nevada
Law Journal).
24 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 212(a) (McKinney 2001).
25 Complaint and Summons, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 12, 1983) (No. 01153/83) (hereinafter "Complaint") (on file with the Nevada Law
Journal).
26 See Record on Appeal at 270, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone, 477
N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 1984) (No. 01153/83) (Exhibit E).
27 Complaint C
28 Complaint D.
Summer 2002]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
forever enjoined and restrained from entering and trespassing upon the roof, the
hall and the stairways.
29
The complaint also sought $20,000, plus interest, for each year of the
Goldstones' allegedly unauthorized use and occupation of the roof, the hall and
the stairways, in addition to the $450,000 damages3° for the "unlawful with-
holding of possession, trespass and encroachment of the roof, the hall and the
stairways"3 and for having "inflicted damage to them."32
When questioned during his deposition as to the factual basis for this
claim of damages, Francis X. (Joe) Maloney, a director who was then a partner
in a major New York law firm and had voted in favor of bringing the lawsuit,
testified:
A. My understanding is that. .. the corporation, by reason of this wrenching experi-
ence, has suffered and has properly alleged that it has suffered damages from the
overall penthouse litigation matter in the sum of $250,000. I think it is a fair damage
claim.
Q. What is the basis for that understanding .... as to how $250,000 can be assigned
to a wrenching experience?
A. I ... have deferred to others to assign a figure. They have done so. I understand
now why they have done so, and I would support it.
Q. On what factual basis, if you have any?
A. I think one can put a value on the psychic injury, if you will, that the apartment
corporation and its tenant-shareholders have undergone by reason of what we con-
sider a misappropriation of corporate property, and I think one can fairly say the
value of that psychic injury, if not actual deprivation of possession is $250,000, and
that is the basis.
33
Walter verified the complaint. However, as his deposition showed, he had
absolutely no knowledge of any facts to support the allegations made therein.
He did not know the condition of PH-B in May 1972 when Dr. Goldstone
signed the subscription agreement to purchase it. He did not know, and made
no effort to find out, whether the planters, wooden walkway, and other
improvements on the eastern and southern roof were in existence when the
Goldstones bought their apartment. Nor did he know anything about the upper
duplex level fire exit hallway.34
His fellow director, Joe Maloney, also a witness on behalf of the Apart-
ment Corporation, was not better informed on the condition of the roof, hall-
way, or stairs in 1972.
In the face of the powerful evidence supporting the Goldstones' claim to
exclusive possession of the roof and hallway, all the Apartment Corporation
could come up with was a rental floor plan, prepared in 1951 when the building
was erected, which was not shown to Dr. Goldstone at the time of his purchase.
29 Complaint T E-F.
30 Complaint G.
31 Complaint G-H.
32 Complaint 27.
33 Deposition, Francis X. Maloney, at 277-277A, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Gold-
stone (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (No. 01153/83). In our opinion, the claim of "psychic injury" to
a corporation was plainly frivolous.
3' Deposition, Walter E. Albrect, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1983) (No. 0 1153/83).
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That plan showed a small concrete surfaced portion of the roof outside the
master bedroom of PH-B, which bears no separate description and is indistin-
guishable from the remainder of the eastern portion of the roof. Moreover, and
most importantly, that plan was not filed as' part of the plan of cooperative
organization, as required by New York law if it was to be used in connection
with the offer or sale of any cooperative apartment.3 5
In their answer, the Goldstones asserted a number of affirmative defenses,
including: estoppel, waiver, laches, and unclean hands. As to the latter, it was
alleged that:
Since June 1982, Gracie Terrace has been and presently is subject to the domination
and control of individuals comprising a majority of its Board of Directors who have
expressed and exhibited open hostility toward the Goldstones and have caused Gracie
Terrace to institute this action solely to harass the Goldstones and cause them great
and irreparable personal and economic hardship by . . . threatening to destroy the
security, privacy, marketability and habitability of their apartment, PH-B, thereby
impairing and sharply diminishing the value of the Goldstones' investment in their
apartment.
36
After considerable discovery, motion practice, and depositions, the Gold-
stones moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme
Court found questions of fact and denied the motion. 37 The Goldstones then
appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department, which modified the order
entered below and granted the Goldstones' partial summary judgment, declar-
ing their right to exclusive use of the entire eastern portion of the roof, the
principal area in dispute.3 8
The Appellate Division reached its result as a matter of the proper con-
struction of the Proprietary Lease. 39 However, in confirmation of its declara-
tion, it noted that the eastern portion of the roof had been improved by the
installation of planter boxes, wooden walkways, and white gravel (which was
seen by the Goldstones during their pre-purchase inspection tours), and that the
prior rental tenants had for at least ten years been permitted exclusive use of
this improved portion of the roof (which was made known to the Goldstones by
the sponsor's selling agent). The court found this "was unquestionably a major
inducing factor in Dr. Goldstone's decision to purchase the apartment."40
The Appellate Division also dismissed all of the Apartment Corporation's
claims for damages.4 1
-5 13 N.Y.C.R.R, Part 17, § 17.4(e) provides: "No room plan, chart or diagram may be used
in connection with the offer or sale of any cooperative unit unless such document has been
filed as part of the plan of cooperative organization." Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v.
Goldstone, 477 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649 (App. Div. 1984). It was the intention of Mr. Winston and
the Sponsor, One Gracie Terrace Company, that all apartments in the building would be sold
on the basis of a physical inspection, not on the basis of the floor plans or diagrams. Id.
36 Answer, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (No. 01153/
83).
3' Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone, 477 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. Div. 1984)
38 Id. at 699.
39 Id. at 700.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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Regardless of whether the Goldstones were conveyed the right to exclu-
sively use the other portions of the roof or the hallway and stairways leading to
the roof, the Apartment Corporation's action "in permitting that use without
objection for a period of almost ten years constituted, at the very least, a revo-
cable license to defendants for the use of those areas."4
The court stressed the fact that the Goldstones had been advised by the
Selling Agent at the time they considered purchasing the shares of PH-B that
the prior tenants had used these areas to the exclusion of the other tenants in the
building, and there was visible, tangible evidence supporting such prior use43
(alarmed panic bolts on the interior of the hallway doors and alarmed gates on
the stairs leading to the roof installed at the recommendation of the Police
Department by the Board of Directors at a time when Maro was not a Board
Member).
The only issue left open (found to present a triable question of fact) was
whether the Goldstones were also entitled to a judgment declaring their right to
exclusive possession of the improved western and southern portions of the roof,
which were directly above PH-A, and the lower level of PH-B.4 These areas
were accessible by the fire stairways, but none of the rooms of PH-B or the
disputed hallways opened directly onto them. This issue was, nevertheless, an
important one for the Goldstones and for the occupant for PH-A because of
privacy and security considerations.
The Appellate Division's decision established an important principle of
New York landlord-tenant law - that the rights of cooperative tenant-share-
holders who purchased their shares in reliance on a physical inspection of the
premises and the terms of the Sponsor's Offering Plan and Proprietary Lease,
could not be altered or restricted by the Apartment Corporation in reliance on
any floor plan or other document that was not filed as part of the cooperative
conversion plan.
IV. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND OUR OPINIONS
The reported decision sheds no light on why the Apartment Corporation's
directors voted to commence what they must have known would be extremely
acrimonious, burdensome, costly, and divisive litigation. The Goldstones had
their share of staunch supporters in the Gracie Terrace community45 and, with
their home and reputations at stake, could not afford to capitulate.
Why would fiduciaries, charged with acting on behalf of and in the inter-
est of their fellow tenant-shareholders, commit the Apartment Corporation to
such a perilous course? Why try to force such a radical change in the decades
long manner in which the occupants of PH-B and the rest of the tenant body
had peacefully coexisted? Why did they continue to litigate for two more years
after the Appellate Division's decision? That decision surely must have told
them they were on a fool's errand.
42 Id. at 701.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 699.
41 Year after year, the vast majority of the tenants in the building re-elected Maro to the
Board. Despite her detractors' charges, they obviously believed she was doing a good job.
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The telling of that story, with the characters fully developed and the many
dramatic episodes chronicled, must await another day. Here, we will only
briefly sketch the highlights insofar as they set the stage for the issues of insur-
ance law and practice.46
We believe the explanation lies in the confluence of several factors. The
tenant body was ready for a change. Maro had been a dominant, visible and
vocal personality and force in operating Gracie Terrace for almost ten years.
Throughout that period of firm hands-on management, her positive achieve-
ments on behalf of the community were many.47 However, no one can please
all of the people all of the time. It was inevitable that her style or actions, or
both, would appear autocratic to some tenants and lead to resentment and real
or fancied grievances against her. Some may have been envious of the Gold-
stones for living in a penthouse apartment. Others may never have been in a
penthouse apartment and simply did not understand that the premium paid for a
penthouse apartment confers on the owners thereof certain rights not granted to
or shared by the other tenants in the building.4 s
Cliques formed, as they will in any community. In 1982, enough of the
anti-Maroists banded together to gain control of the Board of Directors. Walter
became their spokesman and the Apartment Corporation's new president.
This long festering feeling of ill-will was skillfully harnessed, aimed at
Maro and ignited by Bruce Heafitz, a newly elected Board member who, we
have always felt, had his own agenda. We believe that, in his grandiosity,
Bruce coveted the Goldstones' apartment and, if possible, wanted to buy it and
the adjoining PH-A at a substantially below market price.
In those days, Bruce's star appeared to be ascending. A profile in the
business section of The New York Times49 described him as a young "new
energy entrepreneur" who hit it big in the oil industry. In seven years' time,
46 Since we are not privy to or advised of the private discussions of the hostile Board mem-
bers and their advisors, our reference in this article to particular individuals and what may
have motivated them is necessarily just our own opinion and belief, based on the facts as we
experienced and how we understood them as they developed in the litigation.
47 For example, in the field of energy conservation, Maro was the first to introduce Danfoss
non-electric, thermostatic radiator valves into existing apartment buildings in the United
States. She also invented a new form of plastic weather-stripping, costing only three cents a
foot, for the then metal casement windows. For this innovation, she was awarded the Golden
Apple from the City of New York. She and her family were invited to Denmark as guests of
Danfoss and the Danish Government.
48 This is exemplified by the following testimony of Francis X. Maloney, at p. 351 of his
deposition in the Gracie Terrace action on May 6, 1983, as the explanation for why he felt
that the allocation of shares of PH-B did not include the exclusive use of the roof:
I have a strong personal conviction it would be bizarre for one to purchase an apartment in
this town and be in some way deprived of the normal everyday use of the roof of that building.
I can think of a situation where you have a guest who says, "What does the East River look
like from the top of your building? Let's go up and take a look."
I think that your guest would be shocked if you were to respond to him that "This corpora-
tion can't use the roof of the building."
What is shocking is that anyone living at One Gracie Terrace could have thought that
the area outside an expensive penthouse apartment was to be equated with the roof of a
tenement, which is accessible to and may be used by tenants on a hot summer night to gain
some relief from the heat in their apartments.
'9 NEW YORK TiMEs, Jan. 11, 1982, at DI.
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Bruce is said to have gone from living in a third-floor walk-up with "his bank
account overdrawn and his net worth nil" to extreme wealth "in the mid-eight
figures." Along the way, "the walk-up was exchanged for the requisite East
Side cooperative."
Unfortunately, he selected Gracie Terrace rather than the Dakota or some-
thing on Park or Fifth Avenues.
Bruce realized that the other members of the Board, as fiduciaries, would
be extremely reluctant to commit the Apartment Corporation to paying the sub-
stantial and open-ended cost of litigating with the Goldstones. They would not
have been able to justify to the shareholders the expenditure of several hundred
thousand dollars simply to regain possession of the roof and fire exit hallway
which served only the upper level of PH-B. °
To allay their concerns, and as a condition to their voting to commence the
action to recover possession of the roof, hallway and fire stairs, Bruce entered
into an agreement with the Apartment Corporation to pay "all expenses
incurred by it ... in excess of $25,000. ' 51
The first $25,000 was covered by contributions of $10,000 from Walter
and $15,000 from Peter Duffy. In a letter to the shareholders, Walter described
this gift as "an extraordinary act of selflessness. 52 What he did not say was
that Duffy had a run-in with Maro a few years earlier. She had been called by
the building employees because Duffy had been drunk and disorderly in the
lobby of Gracie Terrace on Rosh Hashanah and was making anti-Semitic com-
ments. She called the police, who came and advised him to leave the lobby.5 3
Given this history, altruism does not appear to have been his prime motivation
in joining the effort to bring Maro down.
Flush with confidence in Bruce's supposed gilt-edged financial guarantee
(which turned out to be worthless5 4 ), and with nothing to lose but their honor,
the controlling directors of the Board set off on their quixotic mission to rid the
building of Maro.
50 As he put it in his deposition, "we took a straw poll as to... our feelings about the matter
and a number of my colleagues were cowed by the threat and the potential cost to the corpo-
ration in what might entail from filing this litigation." Deposition, Bruce Heafitz, Heafitz v.
Goldstone (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (No. 8080/1983).
51 In The New York Times article, Bruce was quoted as saying he was "willing to take
risks." Underwriting the litigation costs must have seemed like a good gamble in his quest
for the penthouse apartments. Supra note 48.
52 Letter from Walter E. Albrecht to Peter Duffy (Feb. 4, 1983) (on file with the Nevada
Law Journal).
13 See Letter from Maro A. Goldstone, Director, to Tenant-Shareholders of Gracie Terrace
Apartment Corporation (May 24, 1983) (on file with the Nevada Law Journal).
54 Maro had a premonition about Bruce's ability to stand behind his guarantee. At the
January 12, 1983 Board meeting, she made a motion requiring him to create a $250,000
escrow fund to cover the corporation's anticipated legal fees and expenses. It was voted
down 4 to 2, with Bruce abstaining. Although the Board appears not to have known of it, in
November 1982, Bruce was questioned about rumors that he had filed bankruptcy. Para-
phrasing Mark Twain, he was quoted as saying: "Reports of my financial demise are greatly
exaggerated ... I have not gone bankrupt. I'm not about to go bankrupt. And no one has
asked me to go bankrupt." He termed his financial difficulties as "cash flow bind." See
PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Nov. 8, 1982, at 53.
Bruce's only contribution toward Gracie Terrace's litigation costs was a single payment
of $10,000. He subsequently was unable and unwilling to honor his commitment.
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Maro was vilified as an unfaithful steward who had usurped community
property. Her many and remarkable accomplishments on behalf of the Gracie
Terrace community over years of unpaid service were ignored or denigrated.
Bruce and his cohorts and advisors may have believed that the Goldstones
would never stay the course of a sustained litigation that was sure to exact a
very high toll in terms of money and emotional strain. If so, they badly
miscalculated.
Surrender was never an option. Not while Maro's integrity was being
questioned.
When it became clear that the Goldstones would vigorously defend them-
selves and their home, Bruce apparently decided it was time to attack on
another front.
V. THE HEAFITZ ACTION
On March 21, 1983, Bruce resigned as a director and treasurer of Gracie
Terrace. His letter of resignation outlined his many grievances against Maro
and described her as the "bane of our building" who "has made our life as well
as others rather intolerable." He said his position as an officer and director of
the corporation "have impeded my responding appropriately. 55
At 4:30 p.m. on Good Friday (appropriately enough it was also April
Fools Day), the start of the Easter weekend, Bruce's counsel served Maro, a
fellow director, with (i) an order to show cause seeking injunctive relief to
prevent her from interfering with alteration and construction work in his and his
wife's apartment and (ii) the summons and complaint in the $26 million lawsuit
that they commenced against Maro.
5 6
The action asserted claims for trespass into the Heafitz apartment on three
separate occasions,57 defamation, property damage to their apartment, interfer-
In May and July of 1983, two judgments were entered against Bruce in excess of $11.8
million. On September 29, 1983, his creditors put him into involuntary bankruptcy. See In
re Bruce Heafitz, No. 83 B 11407 (JJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Maro became a contingent creditor of the bankrupt estate by reason of a treble damage
lawsuit she filed against Bruce for violation of N.Y. Judiciary Law section 487. See Gold-
stone v. Heafitz, No. 14164/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
5 One can only marvel at what his conception of responding appropriately must be.
The previous month, Bruce was seen in the lobby of the building with a glass in one
hand and a sledge hammer in the other, threatening to break down a door leading to the
Goldstones' apartment. While that did not happen, on the afternoon of March 15, 1983, the
alarm on the stairs leading to the roof went off. A metal shed that had been erected on the
western portion of the roof (based on a permit from the New York City Building Depart-
ment) belonging to Dr. Goldstone was found to have been vandalized. It was reported to
Maro that Bruce was seen leaving the building shortly after that incident, although he was
never connected to it. See Affidavit, Maro A. Goldstone, Heafitz v. Goldstone (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1983) (No. 08080/83) (in opposition to motion for a preliminary injunction 33-41).
56 Heafitz v. Goldstone, No. 08080/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
51 Maro had gone to the Heafitz apartment after learning that apparently unauthorized alter-
ations and demolition work was taking place. She rang the bell and identified herself to the
workman as a director of the co-op, the only one present in the building that day. She asked
for and was granted permission to enter the apartment for a brief inspection tour to see what
was being done. What she saw led her to believe there was an emergency. A clothes dryer
was vented into the mechanical duct work of the building and it appeared that a structural
Summer 20021
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
ence with and obstruction of the alteration of their apartment, 19-A, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, prima facie tort, and mandamus to turn over
corporate books and records in her possession that Bruce allegedly required to
perform his duties as a director and treasurer of Gracie Terrace. The complaint
sought damages in the aggregate amount of more than $26 million.
In her affidavit in opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction,
Maro stated that the action was brought maliciously and was intended to:
1. harass me and cause me to incur extremely burdensome defense costs as punish-
ment for attempting to carry out in good faith my fiduciary obligations as a director
of GTAC, which obligations required me, inter alia, to file a complaint with the
Department of Buildings of the City of New York on the grounds that (a) plaintiffs
were making unauthorized alterations to their apartment 19-A, and (b) it appears as
though a structural steel column and a load-bearing wall had been removed from the
apartment which could threaten the integrity of the [upper levels of the] building and
the safety of the occupants;
2. to falsely discredit me before my neighbors in the Gracie Terrace community
through the spreading of false and malicious statements and the institution and
financing of baseless lawsuits against me, apparently in the hope that this will force
me to resign or be removed from the board of directors of GTAC;
3. to drive me and my family out of the building after 17 years by making our life
there intolerable;
4. to depress the value of the very desirable duplex apartment, PH-B .... ; and
5. to ultimately coerce my husband to put our apartment up for sale at a greatly
undervalued distress price.
5 8
In his reply affidavit, Bruce accused Maro of being an "immoral and cal-
lous person" who had "terrorized and abused our community" for years. He
likened her "love for Gracie Terrace ... [to] that of the female spider that kills
her mate at the denouement of copulation."'59 No wonder that in an opinion
disposing of one of the many motions in this action the court stated that "this
litigation has been characterized by uncommon acrimony between litigants and
their counsel."
60
To make a very long story short, on April 3, 1986, after three years of
intense and bitter litigation, with numerous charges and countercharges of
impropriety, the Heafitz action was finally discontinued with prejudice, without
any payment to the plaintiffs. As part of a global settlement of all Gracie Ter-
race litigation arrived at with a changed Board of Directors, Maro was reim-
bursed for that portion of her defense costs not covered by insurance.
steel column may have been removed. On her second visit, three days later, she was accom-
panied by a representative of the Managing Agent and an architect. Her third visit, one
month later, was with an inspector of the Department of Buildings who had asked her to
point out the location of the missing wall and steel column.
58 Affidavit, Maro A. Goldstone, Heafitz v. Goldstone (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (No. 08080/83).
19 Reply Affidavit, Bruce Heafitz, Heafitz v. Goldstone (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (No. 08080/
83).
6 Heafitz v. Goldstone, No. 08080/83, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1983) (White,
J.).
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VI. THE GRACIE TERRACE ACCESS ACTION
Since the first two lawsuits had not brought the Goldstones to their knees,
on Friday, February 16, 1984, the Apartment Corporation commenced a third
lawsuit accompanied by still another order to show cause seeking injunctive
relief.61 The ostensible reason for this emergency relief was said to be the need
to gain access to PH-B to rig scaffolding from the eastern roof outside the
Goldstones' master bedroom in order to perform certain repairs to the lower
level apartments on the eastern face of the building which, it was claimed, were
necessary to prevent loose bricks from falling on cars passing the building on
the adjoining FDR Drive.6 2
This turned out to be a colossal blunder by the Apartment Corporation.
We were able to show, with irrefutable photographic evidence, the utter
lack of merit to the Apartment Corporation's position. Access to PH-B was not
needed to accomplish the repairs to the building's eastern faqade. There were a
number of alternative ways in which the repairs could be made, and were in
fact made, that did not require such access. 63
The photographs also showed that in the area of Gracie Terrace, the East
River Drive is completely covered by a pedestrian promenade (John Finley
Walk) and motorists drive underneath the steel and concrete pedestrian walk-
way, as though through a covered bridge. The Apartment Corporation's claim
that loose bricks posed a hazard to passing cars on the FDR Drive was a com-
plete fabrication. It destroyed the plaintiffs credibility with the court.
Moreover, in anticipation of balcony repair work with the possibility of
falling debris, the contractor had erected a covered sidewalk on the promenade
adjacent to the east side of Gracie Terrace and barricaded and fenced off the
area. Finley Walk was totally safe for pedestrians.
The court denied the Apartment Corporation's motion for access to PH-B,
stating:
It is obvious that much more is involved here than the relief actually sought. The
defendant and his present wife, and the present officers and directors of plaintiff
corporation have been embroiled in a bitter and continuing feud since Mrs. Goldstone
was ousted, in 1983, from her position as a director of the cooperative corporation.
[There was] no probative proof that an emergency exists, or that access to the apart-
ment is the only way that the repairs can be made to the extension of the building.
The court found that "in balancing the equities, they do not favor plain-
tiff."' After defeating the access motion, Dr. Goldstone, as the successful ten-
61 Maro humorously refers to this suit as the intended St. Valentine's Day Massacre.
62 We have always believed the real reason for this suit was to gain information for use in
the main Gracie Terrace action and to increase the financial pressure on the Goldstones.
63 For example, motorized scaffolding could have been erected from the promenade to the
sixteenth floor eastern walls where steel hooks previously had been installed for scaffolding
rigging. In this way, the entire job could have been done from outside all of the apartments
at Gracie Terrace. Another alternative was to enter the affected apartments and lower the
construction debris from the balconies through use of a bucket and well wheel, as in fact was
done in some cases.
64 Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone, No. 3941/84, slip op. at 2-3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 2, 1984) (Blyn, J.).
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ant in a litigation with his landlord (co-op), made a successful application for
attorney's fees.6 5 He was awarded attorney's fees of $200.66
While this sum might seem not to have been worth the considerable effort
of securing it, this was the first time in New York that Real Property Law
Section 234 was applied in a litigation involving a co-op. The principle estab-
lished by the decision, that Section 234 applied to cooperative apartment Pro-
prietary Leases, would be used as the basis for Dr. Goldstone's separate action
to recover his considerable legal fees in defending the rest of the Gracie Ter-
race and roof access suits. This potential for a six-figure award of attorney's
fees was a significant factor in the ultimate settlement negotiations.
VII. THREE OTHER RELATED ACTIONS
In May 1983, shortly before the Annual Meeting of Shareholders, three
additional suits, all outgrowths of the Gracie Terrace action, were commenced
against the Apartment Corporation and its majority directors.
A. Maro's Action Against Bruce
Maro countered Bruce's action for trespass, defamation, mandamus, etc.,
with an action against Bruce (who was a member of the New York Bar) and his
lawyer under New York Judiciary Law Section 487(1) which authorizes treble
damages where an attorney is "guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to
any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party." It was
alleged, inter alia, that Bruce's claim that he was treasurer and a director of
Gracie Terrace when he verified his complaint on March 24, 1983, was know-
ingly false and misleading, and an act of deceit or fraud on the court, because
he had executed a letter of resignation on March 21, 1983.67
This suit made Maro a creditor in Bruce's subsequent bankruptcy proceed-
ing where unflattering details of his conduct at Gracie Terrace were exposed.
B. The Harris Action
Jay Harris, a long-time member of the Board of Directors who sided with
Maro, brought an action against Walter, the other Board members, and the
Apartment Corporation to enforce his right, as a director, to inspect the Corpo-
ration's books and records, particularly all documents relating to the authoriza-
tion of, bringing of, and incurrence of expenses for any lawsuit brought in the
name of the Corporation. He also sought, unsuccessfully, to delay the Annual
Meeting of the Shareholders.
65 New York Real Property Law Section 234 provides that whenever a residential lease
allows the landlord to recover attorney's fees in the event of a beach by the tenant:
[t]here shall be implied in such lease a covenant by the landlord to pay to the tenant the reasona-
ble attorney's fees and/or expenses incurred by the tenant ... in the successful defense of any
action or summary proceeding commenced by the landlord against the tenant arising out of the
lease ....
66 Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone, No. 3941/84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.21, 1984)
(Freedman, J.).
67 Goldstone v. Heafitz & Schiff, No. 14164/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
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C. Maro's Action for Access to Books and Records
During her last days as a director, Maro brought an action alleging, in
essence, that the defendant directors had attempted to freeze her out of partici-
pation in the management and review of the affairs of the cooperative and
refused to provide her with documents and access to information to which she
was absolutely entitled to as a director. She amended her complaint after she
was not reelected to the Board, alleging she needed the information to show she
was not guilty of any wrongdoing or mismanagement of the Corporation.
D. Dr. Goldstone's Action for Legal Fees and Damages
By 1985, after two years of unremitting litigation, most of the tenants
longed for peace and stability to return to Gracie Terrace and an end to the
Apartment Corporation's mounting legal fees, which were being passed on to
them.
A new Board of Directors was elected and settlement negotiations were
underway. A stumbling block was Maro's insistence that the Apartment Cor-
poration reimburse the Goldstones, to the last cent, for all of the legal fees and
expenses they had incurred as a result of the Gracie Terrace litigations, and for
which they were not being indemnified by an insurance carrier.68
When the parties appeared to be at an impasse, Dr. Goldstone commenced
an action 6 9 seeking legal fees under Real Property Law Section 234 and dam-
ages for breach of the express covenant of quiet enjoyment in the Proprietary
Lease7 ° and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is implied in
every contract.7' The complaint sought compensatory damages of $755,000
and punitive damages of $800,000.
We took the position that the Apartment Corporation's attempt to oust Dr.
Goldstone from the roof/terrace which had been conveyed to him by the clear
terms of the Offering Plan and Proprietary Lease, and to enjoin his return to
this area, cast a cloud on his possessory rights and was an action for ejectment
proscribed by the express 72 covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Apartment Cor-
poration sought to dismiss this claim on the ground that the Goldstones had not
abandoned their apartment or been ousted from it.
68 Maro considered this necessary to completely expunge the stain on her reputation.
69 Goldstone v. Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp., No. 0419/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
70 The covenant was to "quietly have, hold and enjoy the apartment without any let, suit,
trouble or hindrance from the Lessor . ... " 1 10 of the Proprietary Lease.
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 ("Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."); Van
Valkenburgh N. & N., Inc. v. Hayden Publ'g Co., 30 N.Y.2d 34, 45 (1972) ("There is
implicit in all contracts ... an implied covenant of fair dealing and good faith.").
We argued that for a landlord to bring a lawsuit seeking ejectment and $650,000 in
damages for acts attributed to a tenant-shareholder, when the most cursory investigation
would have proven those allegations to be unfounded, is an act of bad faith and a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
72 Where the alleged breach is of an implied or general covenant, actual or constructive
action is required to obviate the tenant's obligation to pay rent or to hold the landlord liable
for consequential damages.
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Maro's research turned up a then seventy-year old case, Paddell v.
Janes,7 3 in which the court had denied a landlord's motion for judgment on the
pleadings in an action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment on the
ground that the complaint did not allege abandonment of the premises. The
opinion in Paddell v. Janes could have been written with the facts of Gracie
Terrace litigation in mind. After reviewing historical antecedents of this
express covenant, the court stated:
To hold that the parties to this covenant intended to make breach of it depend upon
an actual expulsion would be importing into the agreement terms absolutely unsug-
gested by its language.
7 4
There is nothing in the terms of the covenant to justify the conclusion that it has
not been violated simply because his landlord refrained from aggravating his
wrong by ousting the tenant, or was unable to accomplish that purpose because
of the tenant's successful opposition. She did her utmost to evict him wrong-
fully. Contrary to her promise she subjected him to suits, trouble, and hin-
drances in the enjoyment of the title and possession with which she had
invested the lessee. These facts, if proved, in my opinion amount to a breach of
a covenant as expressed.7 5
If Dr. Goldstone's action, which could not be dismissed on motion, had to
be litigated to conclusion, it would have substantially increased the amount of
the Goldstones' legal fees not covered by insurance 76 that Maro would have
demanded as part of any global settlement.
The Apartment Corporation was in a dilemma. It could not cut off its
mounting legal fees and expenses by a voluntarily discontinuance of its action.
This required Dr. Goldstone's consent,77 which he would not give unless he
was fully reimbursed for his legal fees. If it sought a court order permitting it
to discontinue the action, we would have opposed such an application. We
would have pointed out the privacy and security considerations that made it
important to obtain a judicial determination with respect to the fire exit hallway
and the southern and western portions of the roof, and the compelling force of
our evidence on this subject.78
71 152 N.Y. Supp. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
74 Id. at 953.
75 Id. at 955.
76 In the course of defending claims, insurers are sometimes requested by their insureds to
pay the cost of prosecuting cross-claims, counterclaims, or even separate actions. While
subrogation provisions in the policy may enable the insurer to benefit from any recovery on
affirmative claims, insurers are not required to prosecute such claims. In Keene Corp. v. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., No. 78-1011 (D.D.C. May 13, 1983), Keene sought reimbursement of over
one million dollars expended "in pursuit of its claims for indemnity and contribution"
against certain asbestos suppliers and the United States Government. Id. at 6. The court
held that "[tihe policies do not require the insurers to prosecute affirmative suits on the
insured's behalf." Id. at 7. See also Goldberg v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 80 A.D.2d 409, 411
(N.Y. 1981); Osborne v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 476 S.W.2d 256, 267 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1971).
77 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3217(a) (McKinney 2001).
78 Among other things, we had obtained a statement from Joseph E. Browdy, Esq., then a
partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, who had been counsel for Norman K.
Winston and the Sponsor, One Gracie Terrace Company, in the conversion of the building to
cooperative ownership. Mr. Browdy stated:
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Moreover, even if the Apartment Corporation was allowed to discontinue
its action, it still had to defend against Dr. Goldstone's action seeking
$1,155,000 in legal fees and damages.
VIII. THE GLOBAL SETTLEMENT AND FINAL JUDGMENT
It took another year of contested motions, court-ordered depositions, and
intense negotiating sessions with the new directors before a global settlement of
all pending Gracie Terrace litigation was finally achieved.
On May 8, 1986, a judgment was entered in the Gracie Terrace action, on
consent and pursuant to the parties' stipulation of settlement. It provided that:
1. The parties acknowledge that the eastern portion of the roof adjoining PH-B is a
part of the demised premises and is allocated exclusively to the occupants of that
apartment.
2. The parties acknowledge that the occupant of PH-B shall continue to have the
exclusive use of the adjoining fire exit hallway on the upper duplex level of apart-
ment PH-B. This possession runs with the proprietary lease and any and all renewals
thereof and is not personal to the Goldstones ....
3. The parties acknowledge that GTAC is the owner of the southern and western
portions of the roof on the upper level of PH-B. GTAC will advise all tenants of One
Gracie Terrace that they are not permitted to go up the fire stairs and exit onto those
portions of the roof except in case of fire or other emergency .... Notwithstanding
the foregoing, for as long as [the Goldstones and their children] or anyone of them,
are tenant-shareholders of apartment PH-B, they shall have the irrevocable license to
use those portions of the roof [subject to certain agreed limitations] ....
4. The alarmed security gates on the fire stairs at the lower penthouse level of One
Gracie Terrace, the metal fence separating the eastern portion of the roof on the
upper duplex of PH-B from the southern and western portion of the roof, and the one-
way locking mechanisms on the inside of the fire exit doors in the fire exit hallway
on the upper level of PH-B will all remain in place during the term of all proprietary
leases issued by GTAC, and any and all renewals thereof, and the cost of necessary
repairs, maintenance or replacement of these fixtures will be borne by GTAC ....
5. The Gracie Terrace action, the access suit and Dr. Goldstone's legal fees action are
all discontinued with prejudice and general releases exchanged.
6. GTAC will pay to Jonas and Maro Goldstone the sum of $70,000 ....
7. The parties acknowledge that $1,358.70 of the payments to be made by GTAC to
Maro Goldstone represents indemnification of her as a former director for legal fees
incurred in her defense of Heafitz v. Goldstone . . . (this amount of the reimbursed
retention and coinsurance under GTAC's [D&O policy] and that the sum of
$68,641.83 represents reimbursement for legal fees incurred by Jonas and Maro
Goldstone in their defense of the roof suit and the access suit .... ).
After three and a half years of litigation, and the expenditure of hundreds
of thousands of dollars, the Apartment Corporation had succeeded in confirm-
I. It was the intention of Mr. Winston and the Sponsor that all apartments in the building be sold
on the basis of a physical inspection. 2. It was the intention of Mr. Winston and the Sponsor
that all exterior space and interior physical space which had historically been appurtenant to any
apartment in the building prior to the time of presentation of the Plan to convert the building to
cooperative ownership be conveyed as part of the demised premises of such apartment to any
purchaser thereof at the closing of title.
Record on Appeal at 430, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone, 477 N.Y.S.2d 647
(App. Div. 1984).
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ing and making iron-clad the Goldstones' entitlement to the exclusive use and
possession of the eastern portion of the roof and the upper level fire exit hall-
way, and in guaranteeing the privacy and security of the occupant of PH-B by
keeping in place the security devices and, except in the case of fire or emer-
gency, prohibiting any tenants other than the Goldstones from using the south-
em and western portions of the roof.
IX. THE INSURANCE ISSUES
The Appellate Division's reported decision gives no hint about the insur-
ance issues that lurked beneath the surface and were of paramount importance
to the Goldstones if they were to survive this costly war of attrition.
As the claims multiplied and the Goldstones' costs escalated to extremely
burdensome levels, Maro would frequently ask whether there wasn't some way
to obtain a defense and coverage under the liability section of Jonas's home-
owner's policy and/or Gracie Terrace's D&O policy. After all, while policy
coverage is often denominated as "liability insurance," where the insurer has
made promises to defend "it is clear that [the coverage] is in fact, "litigation
insurance" as well."79 Litigation insurance is what was needed here to even up
the playing field.8"
The general rule regarding the insurer's duty to defend, which is separate
from and broader than the duty to indemnify, is set out in Danek v. Hommer,8 1
where the court stated:
[T]he complaint should be laid alongside the policy and a determination made as to
whether, if the allegations are sustained, the insurer will be required to pay the result-
ing judgment, and in reaching a conclusion, doubts should be resolved in favor of the
insured.
The rule that the insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations
contained within the "four corners of the complaint" is widely followed. s2
New York had embraced this rule. In Seaboard Surety Co. v. Gillette Co.,83
the court noted:
The duty to defend arises whenever the allegations in a complaint against the insured
fall within the scope of the risks undertaken by the insurer, regardless of how false or
groundless those allegations might be .... [T]he duty of the insurer to defend the
insured rests solely on whether the protection [was] purchased .... [S]o long as the
claims [asserted against the insured] may rationally be said to fall within policy cov-
79 Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1984).
80 After collecting and spending the $35,000 from Walter, Duffy, and Bruce, the Apartment
Corporation was able to pass its costs on to the entire tenant body in the form of maintenance
increases and special assessments.
81 100 A.2d 198, 202 (N.J. App. Div. 1953), affd per curiam, 105 A.2d 677 (N.J. 1954).
82 See generally OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DisPUTES
§ 5.02[a][1] (10th ed. 1999). In some jurisdictions it is referred to as the "eight comers" rule
because it looks to the wording within the four comers of the complaint and the four comers
of the policy. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Merch. Fast Motor Lines
Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997) ("An insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allega-
tions in the pleadings and the language of the insurance policy .... This is sometimes
referred to as the 'eight comers' rule.").
83 476 N.E.2d at 275 (1984).
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erage, whatever may later prove to be the limits of the insurer's responsibility to pay,
there is no doubt that it is obligated to defend.
The Goldstones' homeowner's policy issued by USAA offered the best
chance because it covered both Jonas and Maro, as his wife, for liability for
"property damage," a defined term that included "loss of use of tangible prop-
erty which has not been physically injured or destroyed."'84 The Apartment
Corporation's complaint in the Gracie Terrace action sought damages from the
Goldstones for their allegedly unauthorized use of the disputed roof areas and
conversion of a fire exit hallway and the fire stairs. The conduct complained of
resulted in the alleged "loss of use" of the disputed areas to the Apartment
Corporation and the other tenants during the policy period. Thus, it constituted
"property damage" within the meaning of the policy and a potentially covered
claim was asserted. This triggered a duty to defend the entire action for it is
generally held that if there is any potentially covered claim in a multi-claim
complaint, the insurer must defend the entire action.8 5
A. Coverage for the Gracie Terrace Action from USAA
Dr. Goldstone was insured by USAA, under a Comprehensive Personal
Insurance Policy (CPI) and a Personal Umbrella Policy. The CPI policy cov-
ered the named insured and his spouse for "all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of... property damage to
which this policy applies, caused by an occurrence .... ."" Property damage
was defined to include "physical injury to . . . tangible property which occurs
during the policy period... " and "loss of use of tangible property which has
not been physically injured ... ."87 The policy excluded coverage for property
damage to "property owned by the insured" or "property occupied or used by
the insured or rented to or in the care, custody or control of the insured or as to
which the insured is for any purpose exercising physical control."'8 8 The
insurer was contractually obligated to defend any suit seeking damages on
account of property damage "even if any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false or fraudulent."'8 9
On January 26, 1983, we sent a copy of the suit papers in the Gracie
Terrace action to USAA and advised them of Dr. Goldstone's choice of coun-
sel. The complaint clearly alleged property damage during the policy period
and sought a total of $450,000 as damages for the "unlawful withholding of
possession, trespass and encroachment of the roof, the hall and the stairways"
and for having "inflicted damage to them."90
84 Reciprocal Interinsurance Exchange Policy Coverage, United Services Automobile
Association.
85 See, e.g., Ruder & Finn, Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 422 N.E.2d 518, 521 (N.Y. 1981).
86 Reciprocal Interinsurance Exchange Policy, United Services Automobile Association.
87 Id.
88 The Personal Umbrella Policy contained a similar definition of "property damage" and
property damage exclusions, as well as an exclusion for expected or intended damage. Id.
89 Id.
90 Letter to United Services Automobile Association from Thomas R. Newman, attorney for
Dr. Jonas Goldstone and Maro A. Goldstone (Jan. 26, 1983).
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On February 9, USAA acknowledged receipt of our letter. Although it
said it was investigating coverage under a complete reservation of rights, it
sought no further information about the suit. We sent status reports to the car-
rier on February 11 and April 18, 1983. There was no response.
On April 15, 1983, Dr. Goldstone sent our first bill for services rendered
in defense of the action to USAA with the request that it be processed and paid.
There was no response. On May 9, he sent another letter to USAA asking that
the bill be paid. He pointed out that it was bad enough to be sued in a wholly
baseless and maliciously motivated suit, which seeks to recover several hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in alleged damages without having to worry about
how to pay for a vigorous and effective defense. That was why he purchased
liability insurance.
By letter dated May 11, 1983, USAA denied coverage. The two para-
graph letter contained no analysis of the complaint or policy provisions. It did
not indicate that any investigation had been done. Nor did it explain why it
took three and one-half months to say that coverage was denied because "none
of the allegations in the complaint comes within the coverage provided under
the policy of insurance issued by USAA to Jonas or Maro Goldstone." 9 1
We subsequently entered into a dialogue with the insurer's coverage coun-
sel and learned the denial was based on no coverage for expected or intended
damage. We brought to their attention a recent Appellate Division case that
had rejected another insurer's reliance on "intentional harm" exclusions, hold-
ing that it is not "legally impossible to find accidental results flowing from
intentional causes, i.e., that the resulting damage was unintended although the
original act or acts leading to the damage was intentional."9 2
In July 1984, we advised USAA of the Appellate Division's decision
granting the Goldstones partial summary judgment and noted that dismissal of
the damage claims vindicated the insureds and showed the allegations of the
complaint were completely groundless.
We asked the insurer to withdraw its disclaimer and to assume its share9 3
of defense costs, which by that time had amounted to $164,138.86. "Now that
an end to the ill-conceived, groundless and burdensome litigation seems finally
to be in sight, Dr. and Mrs. Goldstone should not be forced to engage in a
further dispute with their own insurance carrier."9 4
In August 1984, the Apartment Corporation made an unsuccessful motion
for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division's order.
In a letter responding to a query from the court, counsel described "The Third
and Fourth Causes of Action - Physical Damage to the Roof' and stated that
9' New York Insurance Law Practices Act § 2601 Unfair Claim Settlement. See Roldan v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 149 A.D.2d 20, 42-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). There has never been a
reported New York case (or any other that we know of) in which punitive damages have
been awarded against an insurer for breach of the duty to defend.
92 At. Cement Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 91 A.D.2d 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
9' Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Gracie Terrace's D&O carrier, had agreed to reim-
burse Maro for a portion of these defense costs.
94 See Letter from Thomas R. Newman, Attorney for Maro A. Goldstone, to Richard L.
Cantrell, Claims Attorney for United Services Automobile Association (July 17, 1984).
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they "include claims that the presence of planters and other items on the roof
have damaged the building's structure and injured the roof."95
We sent a copy of this letter to USAA, pointing out that "the Apartment
Corporation's claim permits a finding that physical damage to the roof, if any
in fact occurred, was unintentional and the result of negligence. That possibil-
ity is sufficient to trigger USAA's defense obligations."96
Two months later, the insurer still had not agreed to assume its share of
defense costs. We again wrote and directed its attention to the case law render-
ing its intentional harm exclusion inapplicable. We concluded our letter by
saying we would have no alternative but to seek judicial resolution if the
insurer did not acknowledge its contractual obligation to pay defense costs
within thirty days.
When three months passed with no response to our letter, we sent USAA's
coverage counsel a copy of a complaint we had prepared and were ready to
serve on the insurer unless the matter was amicably resolved. This finally
resulted in the insurer entering into negotiations with us that culminated in a
satisfactory settlement of Dr. Goldstone's claim.
B. Coverage for the Heafitz Action from USAA
On April 25, 1983, we gave notice of the Heafitz action to USAA under
Dr. Goldstone's comprehensive personal insurance policy and personal
umbrella policy. We sent the insurer copies of the pleadings and asked for a
defense and coverage based on the complaint's allegations of trespass, slander,
and prima facie tort, all of which were covered by the policies. We also
advised USAA that, late in the afternoon of Good Friday and simultaneously
with the service of the summons and complaint, Maro had been served with an
order to show cause and moving papers seeking preliminary injunctive relief
against her.
On June 3, 1983, USAA agreed to pick up the defense of the Heafitz
action under a full reservation of rights and it agreed to "pay a reasonable
attorney's fees for this defense from this date forward."9 7 The carrier took the
position that it was not bound to pay for the considerable legal work and
expense that had been performed prior to its receipt of notice of the action and
without its consent, as required by the policy.
We agreed to table the issue of pre-tender defense costs for the time being,
reserving the right to pursue a claim for those expenses at a later date. The
intensity of the litigation and enormous amount of work it required made it
more important for us to have an agreement in place that would result in future
defense costs being paid.
We explained, however, that, plaintiffs' timing of their action, late on
Good Friday, made it impossible for Dr. Goldstone to have notified USAA, and
91 See Letter from Phyllis H. Weisberg, Attorney for United Services Automobile Associa-
tion, to Hon. Kathryn C. Brown (Aug. 27, 1984).
96 See Letter from Thomas R. Newman, Attorney for Maro A. Goldstone, to Irwin Haut
(Aug. 29, 1984).
97 See Letter from Richard L. Cantrell, Claims Attorney for United Services Automobile
Association, to Thomas R. Newman, Attorney for Maro A. Goldstone (June 3, 1983).
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obtained its consent, prior to engaging counsel to defend Maro.98 We were
confident that, in these circumstances, the insured's right to an immediate
defense meant that the insurer would have to pay pre-tender defense costs. 99
Moreover, USAA's reservation of rights created a conflict of interest that
gave Maro the right to select her own counsel; ° it made sense to select the
firm which was already representing the Goldstones in the related Gracie Ter-
race action and was familiar with the factual background.
Eventually, when the entire litigation was settled and all of the lawsuits
discontinued with prejudice, Dr. Goldstone and USAA reached an amicable
resolution of this issue as well.
C. Coverage for the Heafitz Action from Liberty Mutual
In July 1982, the newly elected officers and directors asked Maro to turn
over to them "the Corporate files which you have built up during the years you
served as Director and President and which are now in your apartment." In
reply, she pointed out the obvious. She had "personal duplicate copies of many
documents relating to Gracie Terrace matters," but the "Corporate files and
records are at the offices of the Corporation's Managing Agent, Counsel and
Certified Public Accountants." Maro declined the Board's offer to copy her
documents at the corporation's expense or to review them in her apartment.
She did offer to share her papers with the Board "provided that a secure storage
space accessible only to all Directors at all times could be created at Gracie
Terrace." Bruce's maid's room was not an acceptable place.
In September, when the Board threatened legal action to obtain her docu-
ments, Maro gave notice to Liberty Mutual, Gracie Terrace's D&O carrier, of
98 We were compelled to work the entire weekend to prepare opposition papers to submit on
April 7, the return date of the order to show cause. By the end of Monday, April 4, we had
already devoted thirty-eight and three-fourths hours to this matter; by the end of April 7, we
logged another twenty and one-half hours, including the court appearance.
99 Pre-tender defense costs have been held not recoverable under an insurance policy, which
contains a clause prohibiting voluntary payment made without the consent of the insurer.
See Smart Style Indus. Inc. v. Penn. Gen. Ins. Co., 930 F. Supp. 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 316-17 (Minn. 1995); LaFarge Corp.
v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 399 (5th Cir. 1995); Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. Transport
Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1997); Cincinnati Cos. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 701 N.E.2d 499,
504 (I1. 1998). The general rule presupposes sufficient time to notify the insurer and for it
to make a coverage determination and engage defense counsel. Where the insured will be
prejudiced if an immediate defense is not mounted, reasonable pre-tender defense costs must
be recoverable if the duty to defend is to have meaning.
o An insurer that contests coverage generally cannot control the insured's defense of the
underlying action. Where the insurer either asserts a reservation of rights or disclaims liabil-
ity as to some ground for recovery alleged in the complaint against its insured, entitling the
insured to a "defense by an attorney of his own choosing, whose reasonable fee is to be paid
by the insurer." See Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815 (N.Y. 1981);
see also Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 544 F. Supp. 669, 686 (W.D. Wis. 1982),
where the court explained:
A conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured does not relieve the insurer of its
contractual duty to defend. Where there is a conflict, the insurer must either provide an indepen-
dent attorney to represent the insured or pay the costs incurred by the insured in hiring counsel of
the insured's own choice.
[Vol. 2:502
THE SAGA OF GRACIE TERRACE
the possibility that a claim might be made against her in her capacity as a
director and former president of the Apartment Corporation. 1'
On April 4, 1983, we sent Liberty Mutual copies of the summons, com-
plaint, and motion for a preliminary injunction in the Heafitz action. We
pointed to the cause of action for mandamus and the allegations that Maro had
in her possession corporate books and records that she refused to turn over to
the plaintiff and other members of the board. We included a copy of Maro's
affidavit in opposition to the motion, which furnished "the background neces-
sary to put this litigation in its proper factual context and show how it arises out
of and related to [her] actions as a director and former president of GTAC."'' 0 2
On July 13, Maro was informed that Liberty Mutual had decided to pro-
vide her with a defense to the Heafitz action and to extend coverage, subject to
a reservation of rights,' °3 for the claims of trespass and prima facie tort."
We kept Liberty Mutual closely advised of the intense activity and volu-
minous papers filed in the Heafitz action. There was a continual stream of
motions and cross-motions, including one to disqualify my firm as defense
counsel. Through a succession of maneuvers in both the trial and appellate
courts, plaintiffs sought to delay or forestall entirely the taking of their deposi-
tions. They failed. Bruce's deposition took place at the Supreme Court Court-
house, pursuant to a court order and under judicial supervision, on July 26,
1983.
D. Coverage for the Gracie Terrace Action from Liberty Mutual
Bruce's deposition testimony made clear that, in commencing the Gracie
Terrace action, he and other newly elected directors had voted to bring that suit
because they believed Maro had breached her duty to the Apartment Corpora-
tion by committing wrongful acts in her capacity as president and a director.
For example, he testified that his fellow directors generally agreed with his
position that Maro "had used her position as a director and officer for her own
interests to the detriment of the apartment corporation," and that she had
abused or misused her power as an officer and director.' 0 5
This testimony was consistent with statements by counsel for the Apart-
ment Corporation during the deposition of Walter in the Gracie Terrace action
that issues raised in the answer "may require proof of Mrs. Goldstone's conduct
as an officer and director" and that "upon a trial it may well get us into issues
concerning Mrs. Goldstone's tenure as corporate president and her activities
during those years."' 0
6
101 See generally Newman & Gioia, Triggering Coverage Under an "Awareness Clause" of
a Claims-Made Liability Policy, 499 FICC Q. 137 (Winter 1999).
102 See Letter from Thomas R. Newman, Attorney for Maro A. Goldstone, to Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company (Apr. 4, 1983).
103 If it was determined that the wrongful acts alleged were not done "solely by reason of
your being a director."
104 There were express exclusions that barred coverage for the claims of defamation and for
the mandamus claim, which did not seek damages.
115 Deposition, Bruce Heafitz at 213-15, Heafitz v. Goldstone (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (No.
08080/83).
1"6 Deposition, Walter E. Albrecht at 101-03, Gracie Terrace Apartment Corp. v. Goldstone
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (No. 01153/83).
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We now had a basis for asking Liberty Mutual to defend the Gracie Ter-
race action, even though Maro had not been sued therein in her capacity as a
corporate officer or director.
We sent Liberty Mutual copies of affidavits and memoranda of law sub-
mitted by the Apartment Corporation in opposition to our motion for summary
judgment in the Gracie Terrace action. These papers continued the attack on
Maro, charging her with having breached her fiduciary obligations to the
Corporation.
We still had to overcome the hurdle that Maro had not been sued in her
capacity as a corporate officer or director. Whenever Maro would say there
had to be a way to obtain a defense of the Gracie Terrace action under Liberty
Mutual's D&O policy, I would repeat, like a broken record, "the law of New
York is clear. The 'four comers of the complaint' govern. There are no claims
in the complaint that are asserted against you in your capacity as an officer or
director of the Apartment Corporation."
Maro would not accept this. She insisted that she and her husband would
not have been sued, but for the animosity she aroused among some of her
neighbors and fellow Board members because of actions she had authorized
and decisions she had properly made in discharging her fiduciary duties during
her long tenure as president and a director of the Apartment Corporation.
It was Maro's unshakable belief that a just legal system should not and
would not permit a corporate officer or director (especially of a not-for-profit
corporation) to be exposed to ruinous defense costs and potential personal lia-
bility simply because a clever plaintiff, intent on burdening the defendant,
could carefully draft a complaint that would not trigger an insurer's duty to
defend the action. She was adamant. Either the law was wrong and ripe for
change or I simply had not researched the point sufficiently.
In late August 1983, while we were still debating this issue, Barry
Ostrager and I put together and co-chaired a program on insurance law. 107
Maro attended the program and heard Barry say, as part of his lecture on the
duty to defend, that in some jurisdictions the four comers of the complaint do
not control. In those jurisdictions, if an insurer has knowledge of facts, which
potentially bring a claim within the indemnity coverage, provided by the policy
it must provide a defense even though the complaint fails to plead all of the
requisite facts."0 8
Armed with this knowledge, Maro promptly called Morgan Cox, the
extremely knowledgeable and experienced claims handler for Liberty Mutual
who had responsibility for the Gracie Terrace claim. Morgan was fair and
open-minded when it came to evaluating an insured's right to coverage. He
agreed to listen to her presentation of why she thought herself entitled to a
defense under Gracie Terrace's D&O policy"° even though the complaint
made no express claim against her in a corporate capacity.
When Maro finished, Morgan said he was sympathetic to her position, but
would need some case law to support a recommendation for coverage. He
"07 This was the first of fourteen annual programs on Insurance, Excess & Reinsurance
Coverage Disputes that we co-chaired for Practicing Law Institute from 1983-97.
108 See, e.g., Previews, Inc. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1981).
10 Fortunately, the policy did not have an "insured vs. insured" exclusion.
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asked whether she knew of any authorities that supported her. Maro told him,
"I'm sure Tom can give you the citation." She then called me and conveyed
Morgan's request for cases in which extrinsic evidence was relied on as the
basis for finding an insurer had a duty to defend. It was my assignment to find
such cases.
I told one of the young lawyers in my office, Carol Baisi, that I had been
put on the spot and had to come up with cases holding an insurer had a duty to
defend on the basis of facts outside the complaint. I asked her to research the
point. Three days later, I was given not only a New York case on point,
Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co. ,11 but one in which Liberty Mutual was
the carrier that had been ordered to provide a defense!
It was an amazing piece of good fortune to be able to cite a New York
case, albeit only a trial court decision, that involved Liberty Mutual, the very
insurer we were trying to persuade to accept the principle of law established by
that case.
In Sucrest Corp., Sucrest sued Fisher Governor Company for breach of
warranty and negligence in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of a shut-off
valve."' After discovery had been initiated, Fisher commenced a third-party
action against Scovill Manufacturing Company, the manufacturer of the forging
in which the shut-off valve had been placed by Fisher. 1 2 Scovill was insured
by Liberty Mutual under a CGL policy with a vendor's endorsement.
On the basis of the allegations in Fisher's third-party complaint describing
its relationship with Scovill, Fisher asserted it was an additional insured under
the Scovill policy and asked Liberty Mutual to assume its defense in the main
action. Liberty Mutual denied coverage, contending that the allegations of the
Sucrest complaint were insufficient to trigger a duty to defend because there
was no claim of negligent design or manufacture directed against Scovill. The
court rejected Liberty Mutual's position:
Liberty's contention that the court may not consider any matter which is not within
the four comers of the Sucrest complaint is without merit under the circumstances of
this case .... [W]here the complaint alleges facts without the coverage of the policy,
but the carrier has knowledge of facts indicating coverage, the insurer is to be guided,
not exclusively by the allegations of the complaint, but also by the facts known to
it.113
We sent Morgan a lengthy letter discussing the Sucrest case. We showed
how the Gracie Terrace complaint was "artfully drafted" to make it appear as
though the action does not involve Maro in her capacity as a corporate officer
"O 371 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
"' Id.
112 Id.
1"3 Id. at 936-38. See also Commercial Pipe & Supply Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 36 A.D.2d
412 (N.Y. 1971), where the court stated:
The language of the complaint need not state all the facts requisite to establish insurance cover-
age. "Where a complaint ... contains ambiguous or incomplete allegations and does not state
facts sufficient to bring a case clearly within or without the coverage, the general rule is that the
insurer is obligated to defend if there is potentially, a case under the complaint ... within the
coverage of the policy." . . .Where, as here, the insurer has knowledge of facts which potentially
bring the claim within the coverage of the policy it has a duty to defend even though the allega-
tions of the complaint fail sufficiently to allege all the facts requisite to do so.
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and director, although in fact that is the reason why it was instituted. We noted
that, by this stratagem, the hostile faction that had gained control of the board
sought to deprive Maro of her coverage under Liberty Mutual's policy and to
subject her and her husband to the punitive financial burden of defending the
action.
There were still more obstacles to coverage. We had previously taken the
seemingly contradictory position in the Gracie Terrace action that Maro "is a
party to this lawsuit only in her capacity as an occupant of PH-B by virtue of
her status as the wife of Dr. Goldstone, the sole tenant-shareholder of PH-B."
It was necessary to explain to Liberty Mutual that "solely for the purpose of
limiting the issues and increasing our chances of winning a summary judgment
motion, we adopted a litigation tactic of urging that this dispute involves
merely a question of the proper construction of Dr. Goldstone's Proprietary
Lease, a question of law for the court." To have raised the issue of the Apart-
ment Corporation's true reason for commencing the action against Maro
"would have destroyed our chances of obtaining summary judgment. It is for
that reason that we stated plaintiff's attack on Mrs. Goldstone is wholly irrele-
vant and creates no triable issue of fact."
Liberty Mutual understood and approved of our litigation decision. It did
not seek to deny coverage on the ground that the Gracie Terrace action was not
directed against Maro for acts as a corporate officer or director. 14
In November, Morgan advised us that Liberty Mutual felt Exclusion D of
the D&O policy ("personal profit or advantage to which [she] was not legally
entitled") might apply and bar coverage for Maro." 5 We then presented the
following analysis to show Exclusion D did not apply.
"Loss" is defined as "any amount an insured is obligated to pay in respect
of his legal liability for a Wrongful Act ... asserted and includes damages...
and costs, charges and expenses incurred in the "defense of legal proceedings
.. " 6 The insurer's defense obligation is triggered whenever there is an
114 Some years later, New York law was settled by the New York Court of Appeals in
Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 575 N.E.2d 90, 93 (N.Y. 1991) (citing OSTRAGER
& NEWMAN, supra note *, at § 5.02[a]).
The court held that, notwithstanding the allegations of the complaint, an insurer must "provide a
defense when it has actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage."
The duty to defend derives, in the first instance, not from the complaint drafted by a third party,
but rather from the insurer's own contract with the insured. While the allegations in the com-
plaint may provide the significant and usual touchstone for determining whether the insurer is
contractually bound to provide a defense, the contract itself must always remain a primary point
of reference. Indeed, a contrary rule making the terms of the complaint controlling "would allow
the insurer to construct a formal fortress of the third party's pleadings .. thereby successfully
ignoring true but unpleaded facts within its knowledge that require it ... to conduct the ...
insured's defense." Further, an insured's right to a defense should not depend solely on the
allegations a third party chooses to put in the complaint. This is particularly so because the
drafter of the pleading may be unaware of the true underlying facts or the nuances that may
affect the defendant's coverage and it might not be in the insured's (or the insurer's) interest to
reveal them.
Id.
115 "The insurer shall not be liable to make any payment in connection with a claim under
insuring clauses IA and lB . . . D. Based upon or attributed to [her] gaining in fact any
personal profit or advantage to which [she] was not legally entitled."
116 See Liberty D & 0 Endorsement (on file with the Nevada Law Journal).
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"assertion" of a claim for a wrongful act, even though it may subsequently be
proved to be groundless, false, or fraudulent. A finding of "actual" legal liabil-
ity for the alleged wrongful act is not necessary.
Any other interpretation would lead to an absurd result: a director who
successfully defends against an "asserted" but baseless claim of a wrongful act
would not be reimbursed for the cost of defense, while a faithless director who
sustains a loss because of the imposition of legal liability for an "actual"
wrongful act would recover the defense costs.
The exclusion was meant to apply to such situations as where a corporate
officer embezzled corporate funds or in some other manner lined his or her own
pocket by "gaining in fact" some personal profit or advantage "to which he or
she is not legally entitled." That was not this case.
Dr. Goldstone was, at all relevant times, the sole shareholder and Proprie-
tary Lessee of PH-B. Under the terms of the lease, Maro as his wife, was
contractually and "legally entitled" to live in the apartment. By doing so, she
did not derive any personal profit or advantage to whidh she was not "legally
entitled."
The Apartment Corporation's asserted claim (which was denied) was that
Maro breached her duty and misused and abused her powers as a corporate
fiduciary through her neglect, error, or omission to cause the Corporation to
take steps to recapture the corporate property that, allegedly, had been con-
verted to the personal use and advantage of a tenant-shareholder. She was not
that shareholder. The claim was not, as it could not have been, that she, "in
fact," had gained any personal profit or advantage "to which she was not
legally entitled." Thus Exclusion D did not apply and the assertion of the claim
entitled Maro to a defense of the action.
Five months later, at the end of April 1984, Liberty Mutual agreed to
reimburse Maro for costs and expenses incurred in her defense of the Gracie
Terrace action.
In August 1984, after we advised Liberty Mutual of the Appellate Divi-
sion's decision granting partial summary judgment to the Goldstones in the
Gracie Terrace action, Morgan was kind enough to send us a congratulatory
letter in which he said that while this was not the largest D&O claim he had
worked on, "it was the most complicated from a coverage standpoint."
X. AN ETHICAL PROBLEM DEFTLY HANDLED BY THE INSURER
For many months, counsel for the Apartment Corporation had been pres-
suring Liberty Mutual for copies of its correspondence with Maro concerning
the coverage it was providing to her under the D&O policy for the Heafitz
action. 17 Counsel also asked what its position would be with respect to cover-
age for the Gracie Terrace action.
We considered this to be an unethical attempt to "meddle in, interfere with
or disrupt" the separate contractual and fiduciary relationship between Liberty
and its insured. The insurer was being asked to divulge to counsel for the
117 The Board and its counsel even considered making a complaint to the New York Insur-
ance Department if Liberty Mutual did not comply with their demands.
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plaintiff confidential communications between it and its insured relating to the
action in which it was providing a defense.
We pointed out to counsel that "[w]here two or more insureds under the
same policy are in an adversarial position, the insurer must respect the integrity
of its separate fiduciary relationship with, and obligation toward, each individ-
ual insured." We threatened to sue them if Maro sustained any injury as a
result of their conduct.
Liberty Mutual understood perfectly the ethical considerations involved.
Morgan wrote a letter to Walter and counsel for both sides saying:
Certainly, our policyholder, the Corporation, has a right to be informed of what busi-
ness is being conducted as respects this coverage. On the other hand, I feel that I
must be concerned about the rights of each Director and/or Officer claiming, or enti-
tled to, coverage under our policy. If you wish to waive any assertion of conflict of
interest against the parties involved, perhaps that would allow us to come together
and allow me to make disclosure. Kindly advise your wishes. 118
Liberty Mutual respected our position that there be no blanket disclosure.
It declined to respond to repeated inquiries from the Apartment Corporation's
counsel without our consent or waiver of the conflict.
XI. EPILOGUE
In May 1984, before the Appellate Division's decision and at a time when
the final resolution of the Gracie Terrace litigation was still in doubt, the Gold-
stones' then fifteen year old son, John, captured the essence of what was hap-
pening in the building in the following poem. His prophecy turned out to be
amazingly accurate.
ONE GRACIE TERRACE
The bitch on the throne,
Miss Regalia, Queen that Rules
From Above.
10 years her reign,
Chronicles of pain.
So,
The Masses Revolted.
Oh, it was sad to see
- the Queen dethroned,
Exiled now to her penthouse home.
Were the masses jealous, envious,
Hard to control,
Or were they correct in their
Overthrowing poll?
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They worshiped her, and hated her
For doing well.
Thus they sent the Queen to Hell.
She met there Bruce, Archduke of Brimstone,
Who coveted the Queen's penthouse to roam.
The masses didn't care, didn't want to be involved;
They had their own problems to solve.
Her ten years were finished and done.
All good she accomplished over
In a single year of fun.
The bitch had been banished
And in her place,
Rule Five Men Brave and True,
Who had trumped Maro's ace.
Not satisfied, they set at her heels
Loosing Bruce to deprive her of meals.
Not only was the Queen's reign done,
The board-elect wished for Her Highness to run
And leave her penthouse palace
Soon to be occupied by Bruce's malice.
But the Queen had only lost her throne,
Some still supported her - she was not alone -
And though she was hit with several lawsuits,
Daddy saved his darling from the clutches of Bruce.
The people looked in horror as their fairy tale land
Was Raked end to end with a soiled bloodly hand.
Civil War erupted, and Maro returned to fight
For a building that betrayed her
- though perhaps they were right.
Suddenly fate intervened
For now Bruce, it seemed
Had been deposed as well.
No longer did he rule in Hell.
Bruce had finally lost his cash
- Perhaps his threat was broken at last.
The Banks moved in for the kill,
And yet Bruce vowed to break the Queen still.
Tom, her knight protector true
Clashed with her enemies (lawyers too);
And however his summary judgment had lost,
He swore a vow to win for her at any cost.
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And so the stage was set for battle
With tenants hiding like frightened cattle.
Some cried for peace, some for war
As legal debts doubled in score.
A war of paper, hate and law,
Of staring at the enemy as elevators
Zoomed down into a gaping maw.
Across One Happiness Place there was total strife,
As every man fought with every man's wife.
And then, at last, a peace of sorts
A lawsuit dropped,
A lawsuit won.
A death, divorce - but whose, which one?
This poem unfinished, the prose discontinued,
A vague prophecy had been issued.
For who can tell which side had won.
Before the proper time had come?
The Queen will once again reign from above
(Though not, perhaps, as before).
Bruce shall leave, a strife - torn man,
While Tom must deal with other problems at hand.
Our Five Men Brave and True shall retire,
To spend their time before a brooding fire.
Karen departs from Bruce,
And One Gracie Terrace will resurrect itself
To not quite its former state.
Its saving changes come about a little too late
This poem drifts away
Like dreams,
Knowing all will become not quite as it seems
JOHN T. GOLDSTONE
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